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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of consolidate –national and provincial– fiscal policy in Argentina on 
income distribution, building a novel panel data for 1995-2010 considering the 24 jurisdictions and 
quintile groups within provinces. We allocate expenditures, taxes and transfers among provinces 
and among people within provinces, according to benefit and incidence principles, avoiding double 
accounting, and build three measures of income: ex ante, interim, and ex post (or extended) 
income. We find that i) personal income inequality increased between 1995 and 2002, and then 
reverted the trend; ii) the trends in income inequality have a parallel with the different 
macroeconomic regimes nested in the sample (convertibility between 1995 and 2001 and post 
convertibility since 2002); iii) the effect of fiscal policy is a reduction in the Gini coefficient of 6 
points in 1995, 5 points in 2002 and 10 points in 2010; iv) the mix of instruments to redistribute 
income changed with time towards cash transfers and against in-kind expenditures; iv) provincial 
budgets contribute strongly to progressivity; v) social expenditure is the most important 
redistribution tool, but economic services have grown in size between sub-periods, pushed by 
government subsidies in energy and transport, and vi) the paper measures the distribution of 
budget but leave aside the distribution of results (e.g., expenditure performance).   
JEL Code: H7, I3. 
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Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution. Argentina 1995 - 2010 
I. Introduction 
The aim of fiscal policy has changed in time according to the evolution of the theories of the state 
(see Musgrave, 1996). In the “services state” of Adam Smith, the main role of the state was to 
allow the proper functioning of the market economy by providing a legal system, protection to 
society from foreign aggressions, public works that –because of size– could not be provided by the 
private sector, and basic education for the poor. The tax principles according to benefit and ability 
to pay were assumed to coincide, so that the distributional impact of fiscal policy was –by 
assumption– neutral. Later on, especially since Second World War II, societies became fully aware 
of the differences in per capita income and life standards between rich and poor people and 
regions and were concerned about redistribution.1 Since then, one of the functions of the 
government under the “welfare state” has been the reallocation of income which results from 
market forces. 
The theoretical literature on the role of different levels of government on income redistribution 
put this function in the head of the central government (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). According 
to this point of view, allowing redistribution at sub-national level of government would be subject 
to two problems (Tresch, 2002). One arises from the mobility of people, as rich people have 
incentives to move to jurisdictions with lower taxes and poor people have incentive to move to 
jurisdictions with higher benefits. Migrations would tend to frustrate redistribution at the cost of a 
lower per capita income (this is the “competition problem”). Another problem –referred to as the 
“incompatibility problem”– would arise, even without mobility, when more than one level of 
government redistributes income if they target different beneficiary groups. In spite of these two 
problems, the experience from most countries shows that redistribution from sub-national fiscal 
budgets is important (see Sewell, 1996, and more recently Hoynes and Luttmer, 2012; Baicker, 
Clemens and Singhal, 2012; among others).2 For Argentina, according to Cont and Porto (2014), 
provincial budgets are more important than the national budget as a tool for redistributing 
personal income, accounting for approximately 70% of the change in the Gini coefficient. 
                                                            
1
 See a recent review in Tanzi (2014). 
2
 Prud´homme (1995) considers it hard to think of a country that carries out redistributive policies at sub-
national level (p. 202), while Sewell (1995), in answer to Prud´homme (1995), finds it hard to think in one 
that does not. Hoynes and Luttmer (2012) estimate the total value (redistributive value and insurance value) 
that individuals obtain from state taxes and transfers. The insurance component increases with income 
while the redistribution component decreases with income. This way, citizens benefit one way –
redistribution– or another –insurance–; and this could explain why mobility has not thwarted the tax-
subsidy state policies. Under this explanation, there would be no the “competitive problem”. Clemens and 
Singhal (2012) show that a significant share of state expenditures is destined to redistributive programs, but 
at the same time is strongly conditioned by federal transfers. Continuous interferences by the federal 
government have debilitated the forces of fiscal competition. 
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Another question concerns the relevant dimension of distribution: should the aim of fiscal policy 
be the regional distribution of income (called “horizontal distribution”, from the central 
government to sub-national governments), the personal distribution (called “vertical distribution” 
from the central government to peoples), or both?  In this regard, it is worth noting that this is not 
an outstanding distinction because all fiscal variables that redistribute among provinces do 
redistribute among people. Horizontal redistribution becomes vertical through provincial (or, for 
that matter, municipal) expenditures; meaning that redistribution is vertical. Hence, personal 
distribution of income should be the matter of concern, as the ultimate arguments included in the 
welfare function are individuals’ utilities. Moreover, there is recognition of a possible failure in the 
regional distribution principle. In particular, it could be the case that regional redistribution could 
generate a result in which rich people from poor regions be subsidized by poor people from rich 
regions.  
The empirical literature on the impact of fiscal policy on personal income distribution followed 
different, and mostly partial, approaches.3 Concretely, papers analyze only a level of government, 
or focus on the incidence of the tax system or a subset of taxes, or analyze the incidence of total 
expenditure or a subset of expenditures (typically, social expenditure), or study the impact of 
inter-governmental transfers on income distribution (in many cases, focusing on destination of 
transfers, i.e., disregarding the source of funds considering that transfers are “manna”, or in a few 
cases, correctly including the source of funds). Partial approaches may hide the full effect of fiscal 
policy and lead to incorrect policy results and recommendations. 
This paper studies the effect of consolidate –national and provincial– fiscal policy in Argentina on 
income distribution, building a novel panel data for 1995-2010 considering the 24 jurisdictions (23 
provinces and the City of Buenos Aires) and quintile groups within provinces (120 per year).4 We 
allocate expenditures, taxes and transfers among provinces and among people within provinces, 
according to benefit and incidence principles, avoiding double accounting. Then, following the 
Reynolds-Smolensky approach (1977), assess progressivity of taxes and expenditures at both 
national and provincial levels of governments in Argentina. We study the evolution of three 
measures of income distribution: a) ex ante – which results from market forces; b) interim – which 
results from adding public cash transfers and subtracting direct taxes to a); and c) ex post (or 
extended) – which results from adding in-kind public goods and subtracting indirect taxes to b). 
The results of the paper are summarized as follows: i) personal income inequality, increased 
between 1995 and 2002, and then reverted the trend; ii) the trends in income inequality have a 
parallel with two different macroeconomic regimes captured in the sample (convertibility between 
                                                            
3
 We omit a full literature review on the impact of fiscal variables on income distribution. The reader is 
referred to Cont and Porto (2014). 
4
 At least for Argentina this is the first paper that measures the impact of consolidate fiscal policy on regional 
and personal income distribution for a long time span (see Cont and Porto, 2014, for a specific year). 
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1995 and 2001 and post convertibility since 2002); iii) the effect of fiscal policy is a reduction in the 
Gini coefficient of 6 points in 1995, 5 points in 2002 and 10 points in 2010; iv) the mix of 
instruments to redistribute income changed in time towards cash transfers and against in-kind 
expenditures; iv) provincial budgets contribute strongly to progressivity; v) social expenditure is 
the most important redistribution tool, but economic services have grown in size between sub-
periods, pushed by government subsidies in energy and transport; and vi) the paper measures the 
distribution of budget but leave aside the distribution of results (e.g., expenditure performance).   
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the methodology and data. Section III 
summarizes the economic and social situation in Argentina, as well as the main public finance 
statistics. Section IV shows the main results. Finally, Section V presents some conclusions and 
recommendations.  
II. Methodology and data 
II.1. Methodology  
National budget, transfers and provincial budgets 
Consider a province n with i households (labelled n=1,…,N and i=1,…,I, respectively). The national 
government collects revenues from taxes subject to sharing regimes (VAT, income taxes, excise 
taxes, etc.), labelled tcn, of which retains a share β, and other non-shared taxes (e.g., taxes on 
exports), indexed with the subscript ton, to finance national expenditure. National expenditures 
(gN) are allocated by categories (k) and provinces (n), i.e., gNkn. Also, the national government 
allocates discretionary transfers among provinces (ddn) with national funds.  
The contribution of the province n to the revenue sharing regime is an = (1-β) Σc tcn. Provincial 
governments receive transfers according to the revenue sharing regime (drn) and other discretional 
transfers (ddn), which, together with provincial taxes (tsn), finance provincial expenditures that are 
allocated in j categories, gPjn.  
The national budget is  
  ∑ ∑  ∑  	 ∑ 
 ∑   ∑      (1) 
while province n’s budget is  
   ∑  	 ∑                  (2) 
Impact of fiscal variables on personal distribution of income 
Let min be the individual income before national and provincial fiscal policies (in this paper, we 
consider i as a quintile). The individual benefits from the national (provincial) budget depending on 
the distributional patterns of taxes and expenditures. Let national expenditure gNkn be distributed 
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according to weights γikn, provincial expenditure gPjn be distributed with weights γijn, national taxes 
tcn and ton be collected with weights τicn and τion, and provincial taxes with weights τisn.
5  
Let cin be the ex-post income of household (quintile) i in province n, which, by construction is, 
 	  ∑ .  ∑  .  ∑ .  ∑ .   ∑ .   (3) 
or put more simply, 
    	              (4) 
that is, the ex-post (extended) income is the ex-ante income plus national and provincial 
expenditures minus national and provincial taxes. It is clear from the description and equation (3) 
that both national and provincial governments affect personal income through the levels and mix 
of taxes and expenditures, as long as cin ≠ min. The measurement of the impact of fiscal policy on 
income distribution can be done as a standard comparative statics exercise between ex-ante and 
ex-post income distributions.  
Note, in passing, that neither transfers nor shares of coparticipable taxes (β) appear in equation 
(4). They are subsumed in individual taxes or provincial expenditures, implying that regional 
redistribution turns out being part of personal redistribution. 
Summary of the effects of fiscal variables on income distribution 
The effects of national and provincial fiscal policies on personal income distribution are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Incidence of national expenditures and taxes on quintile i: giNn and tiNn (equations (3) 
and (4)). 
2. Incidence of provincial expenditures, provincial taxes and national taxes on quintile i: 
giPn and tiPn (equations (3) and (4)). 
Household (quintile) i benefits from fiscal policy (at both levels of government) if cin > min, which 
results from the interaction of national and provincial expenditures and taxes, and the revenue 
sharing regime.  
Gini coefficient of income inequality 
This paper uses the Gini coefficient of income inequality, and similar mathematical formulas for 
concentration curves (expenditures and taxes). This coefficient is calculated as 
                                                            
5
 Matrix TNn (i × c+o) summarizes the national tax weights; matrix BNn (i × k) summarizes national 
expenditures weights; matrix TPn (i × s) summarizes provincial tax weights and matrix BPn (i × j) summarizes 
provincial expenditures weights. In all the cases, the sum of the weights adds one. 
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where households are ranked from lowest to highest income. The number of income groups is I=5, 
given the division of population into quintiles (having pooled quintiles-province into quintiles-
country); y is the ex ante, interim or the ex post income; and yP is the average income of the unit 
under analysis.6 
To assess the impact of fiscal policy on income distribution, we use the indicator proposed by 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). The application of this indicator to a particular jurisdiction is  
  )*+ 	 
,-.,-!,'.,'!/-./-!/'./'
",-",'!/-!/'
     (6) 
where tN (tP) is the national (provincial) tax effort; gN (gP) is the national (provincial) expenditure, 
all relative to income; KtN (KtP) is the Kakwani index of national (provincial) taxes (equal to the 
difference between the concentration of taxes and (5)); and KgN (KgP) is the Kakwani index of 
national (provincial) expenditures (equal to the difference between (5) and the concentration of 
expenditures). We allow for government surplus or deficits, i.e, tN + tP ≠ gN + gP.   
II.2. Data  
The starting point is the level of provincial income, summarized in the Gross Geographic Product 
(GGP), with base 1993, published by Council of Federal Investment (CFI) until 2006 and then 
updated by regional drivers (there is a recent update of the national GDP, with base 2004, but 
information is incomplete to replace the series with base 1993). Distribution of income is reported 
in the Permanent Household Survey (PHS, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares), published by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (INDEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos). Given that 
income declared in PHS includes transfers from the government to people (cash transfers, 
benefits, social security payments, etc.) and is net from direct taxation (personal income taxes, 
social security contributions, etc.), it is an interim income.7 We subtract cash expenditures and add 
direct taxes to arrive to the ex-ante income. Per capita income is obtained from dividing income by 
population (source: INDEC). On the other hand, starting from interim income, we add in-kind 
expenditures and subtract indirect taxes to arrive to ex-post (or extended) income. 
We allocate taxes and expenditures among quintiles, by making assumptions on weights (γikn, γijn, 
τicn, τion, τisn). The construction of these weights is a challenge in itself. In the case of taxes, a 
distinction is made between direct taxes (on families’ income and wealth), in which case taxes are 
                                                            
6
 We may underestimate inequality when we pool quintiles-provinces within quintiles-country (i.e., there is 
a level of within-inequality), but we do not explore it in this paper. 
7
 Notice that we distinguish direct taxes from indirect taxes in a somewhat different way than standard 
public finance literature. In this paper “direct” means that it is deducted from the declared income by 
households. Thus, a direct tax such as property tax is considered an indirect tax in the classification used in 
this paper. 
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allocated based on tax affidavits and household surveys, and indirect taxes (on goods and 
services), in which case taxes are allocated on consumption, production or trade patterns. In the 
case of expenditures, the allocation across households depends on the type of expenditure. The 
allocation of cash expenditures among households is quite straightforward, but the allocation of 
public and quasi-public goods is complex, depending on assumptions on the use services 
(whenever information is available), or in proportion of income or/and population.8  
These individual allocations must be consistent with national taxes collected from different 
provinces, national expenditures distributed among provinces (and groups of provinces), national 
transfers to provinces,9 which, together with provincial taxes, finance provincial expenditures. 
III. The case of Argentina  
Table A.1 in Appendix A summarizes some social and economic indicators of Argentina 
corresponding to year 2010. Per capita income is over US$ 9,000, which increases to near US$ 
11,000 in the groups of Advanced provinces and Low Density provinces and less than US$ 5,000 in 
the Intermediate and Lagged groups (with some disparities within groups). A similar qualitative 
relationship holds for social indicators such as Unsatisfied Basic Needs, while in other indicators 
(such as Human Development Index) it displays less heterogeneity. 
Table A.2 in Appendix A summarizes evolution of national and provincial budgets (as percentage of 
GDP).10 Total expenditure averaged 32% of GDP in the period 1995-2010, with a minimum of 27% 
in 2002 and 2004, and a maximum of 41% in 2010 (and continued growing ever since). A little 
more than half of this expenditure is exerted by the national government. Government revenues 
averaged 31% of GDP, with a minimum of 26% in 2002 and a maximum of 41% in 2010. The 
national government contributed between 75% and 80% of total revenues, transferring the 
provincial government about 30% of total revenues collected at the central level (26% through 
revenue sharing –22% in 2010– and 4% of discretionary transfers –8% in 2010–). 
About one-third of net-of-debt-interests expenditures take the form of cash transfers or direct 
payments while two-thirds consist of in-kind public or quasi-public expenditure. There was a little 
                                                            
8
 The description of the allocation rules, which is too long to be presented in an Appendix, is being published 
in a working paper. See Schwartz and Ter-Minassian (2000) for criticisms on allocation rules. 
9
 Transfers to provinces are currently conformed by resources from revenue-sharing regimes 
(coparticipation, education fund, services transfers, and a regional compensating fund); resources to fund 
social security systems (a percentage of VAT and personal assets); road, electricity infrastructure and 
housing funds (collected from taxes on liquid combustibles); a percentage of income tax destined to social 
works and the Conurbano Fund; specific funds (collected from taxes on personal assets and the 
monotributo); electricity fund; and non-automatic or discretionary transfers.  
10
 Municipal budget is excluded because detailed information is unavailable. They represent 8% of total 
expenditure in Argentina. Nonetheless, they are indirectly considered in the analysis through the transfers 
from provinces to municipalities (which represent about half of municipal expenditures).  
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bias towards cash expenditure in 2002 and 2003 (reaching 37% of total expenditure) and it is 
possible that this share increased again after 2010. 
On another hand, about two-thirds of net-of-debt-interests expenditure was assigned to social 
services, 10% to economic services and 23% to administration, defence, safety and justice. More 
recently, the increase in subsidies to consumers of energy and transport services changed these 
shares to 63.5%, 15.5% and 21% respectively.  
Finally, government revenues were collected from production, consumption and transfer activities 
(50%), income and assets (38%) and other sources (12%). These shares have remained stable 
during the time sample; however, they hide shifts in individual taxes. For example, VAT, income 
tax, turnover tax and export tax accounted for 43% of total revenues during 1995-2001 and 52% of 
total revenues during 2003-2010. Between 1995 and 2010, income taxes and export taxes 
increased 3% of GDP each. 
IV. Results  
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the evolution of the Gini coefficients of inequality in income 
distribution for Argentina, between 1995 and 2010. The first index –Gini ex ante– measures (a 
simulated) income inequality arising from market forces, without government intervention. This is 
a fictional starting point since it is widely known that market forces must coexist with a minimum 
provision of public goods. Also, since we started from the real situation to construct the ex-ante 
distribution of income, we omitted effects that would arise from removing taxes and government 
transfers (i.e., consumers finding other sources of income, adjusting consumption, etc.). The 
second index –Gini interim– measures income inequality after adding government cash 
expenditures (transfers and payments to households) to, and subtract corresponding taxes 
(referred to as “direct taxes”) from, ex ante income. This is the income that households report in 
households surveys (like the Permanent Household Survey in Argentina). The third index –Gini ex 
post– adds to actual income a residuum coming from provision of in-kind public and quasi-public 
goods (education, health, etc.) and subtracts indirect taxes, which results in a measure of 
extended income. 
As it was already shown in other papers, income inequality, as declared by surveyed households, 
increased between 1995 and 2002, then reverted the trend, although with a specific interruption 
in 2009 (see, for example, INDEC, 2015, Gasparini, 2006, and Gasparini and Cruces, 2009).11 The 
evolution of the other two Ginis (ex ante and ex post) is qualitatively similar to that of the Gini 
interim.  
                                                            
11
 There may be differences in levels of inequality among the references and the figures reported here, 
which derive from different universe of households, pooling of income groups, computation methodologies, 
etc., but trends do not differ. 
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Figure 1. GINI ex ante (market forces); Gini interim (cash transfers and direct taxes), Gini ex post 
(public provision, indirect taxes) 
 
 
Table 1. GINI ex ante (market forces); Gini interim (cash transfers and direct taxes), Gini ex post 
(public provision, indirect taxes) 
 
 
The Gini ex ante increased from 0.470 in 1995 to 0.523 in 2002 (0.05 worse than 1995) and to 
0.483 in 2010 (0.01 worse than 1995). The Gini interim increased from 0.457 to 0.508 in 2002 
(0.05 worse than 1995) and decreased to 0.451 in 2010 (0.01 better than 1995). The Gini ex post 
increased from 0.409 in 1995 to 0.471 in 2002 (0.06 worse than 1995) and decreased to 0.386 in 
2010 (0.02 better). The effect of fiscal policy is a reduction in the Gini of 6 points in 1995, 5 points 
in 2002 and 10 points in 2010. Moreover, in year 2002 (last macroeconomic crisis in Argentina), 
fiscal policy barely compensated the inequality in 1995 (i.e., the Gini ex post in 2002 –0.471– was 
almost the same as the Gini ex ante in 1995 –0.470–). 
0,300
0,350
0,400
0,450
0,500
0,550
Gini ex ante Gini interim Gini ex post
Ginis 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Gini ex ante 0,470 0,480 0,485 0,489 0,498 0,502 0,508 0,523 0,521 0,510 0,503 0,502 0,482 0,480 0,498 0,483
Gini interim 0,457 0,465 0,468 0,472 0,482 0,485 0,494 0,508 0,494 0,481 0,471 0,467 0,458 0,452 0,464 0,451
Gini ex post 0,409 0,419 0,423 0,426 0,434 0,439 0,439 0,471 0,456 0,436 0,420 0,416 0,402 0,392 0,400 0,386
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In order to interpret the effect of fiscal policy (in this case, the difference between Gini 
coefficients) we perform a Reynolds-Smolensky decomposition.12 Figure 2 and Table 2 show the 
evolution of RStrasnfers (which measures the change from Gini ex ante to Gini interim) and 
RSinkind (which measures the change from Gini interim to Gini ex post).13 Therefore, the 
difference between Ginis ex ante and ex post income corresponds to the sum of RStransfers and 
RSinkind. 
Figure 2. Progressivity of expenditures (transfers, in kind) and taxes (to finance transfers, to 
finance in kind expenditures) 
 
Observations: each line measures the contribution of expenditure (Kg * g) and taxes (Kt * t) 
Both RSinkind and RStransfers are positive-definite in this Figure and Table 2. 
 
The mix of instruments to redistribute income changed with time: during the first years of the 
sample the ratio RStranfers / (RStransfers + RSinkind) was less than 25%; this ratio reached a 
maximum of 42% in 2003, then decreased to a 33% between 2008 and 2010. The intensity in the 
                                                            
12
 Given the way we pool quintiles in provinces into national quintiles, the reordering effect from 
consolidate budget is almost null (see Aronson and Lambert, 1994). We will discuss this effect in a 
companion paper. 
13
 Alejo, Bérgolo and Carbajal (2013) decompose income distribution by the contribution of different sources 
of income (private and public, and social security, government transfers and others within public sources) in 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil during the decade of 2000s. The progressive results for Argentina coincide with 
those in this paper. While they concentrate on the different sources of income, the main difference with this 
paper is that we include revenues and expenditures –both cash and in kind–, consider national and 
provincial governments, and decompose effect among groups of provinces (and among provinces, 
forthcoming); but we pool some sources of income, which are analyzed separately in their paper. 
-0,04
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0,00
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0,12
Expenditure (in kind) Expenditure (transfers)
Tax (x in kind) Tax (x transfers)
RSinkind(+) RStransfers(+)
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use of instruments tilted towards cash transfers and against in-kind expenditures. The mix effect 
has two consequences. On the one hand, it creates dependence by cash-recipients, not only a 
financial dependence but also a political dependence, favoring clientelism. On the other hand, it is 
far from the most efficient tool to correct income distribution, because X pesos in transfers are 
spent in current consumption, while X pesos spent as in-kind public good (schools, transport 
infrastructure, hospitals, urban infrastructure, justice, water and sanitation, etc.) benefits large 
groups of recipients, during a long-time period. Of course, there may be exceptions (such as the 
years following the 2002 crisis) in which a temporary tool of monetary transfers may be justified. 
Table 2. Progressivity of expenditures (transfers, in kind) and taxes (to finance transfers, to 
finance in kind expenditures) 
 
 
The trends depicted in Figure 1 have a parallel with the different macroeconomic regimes nested 
in the sample (convertibility between 1995 and 2001 and post convertibility since 2002). From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the period between 1991 and 2001, known as the 90s decade, was 
characterized by an economy with an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar subject to the 
Convertibility Law, strict monetary rules, but lax fiscal rules that ended in deficits during the 
second half of the decade and a social and economic crisis by the end of 2001. After the critical 
year of 2002, the next eight years were characterized by an expanding economy exposed to very 
favorable external conditions, a fixed exchange rate albeit free from the constraints imposed by 
the Convertibility Law, and more flexible monetary and fiscal environments (see Figure 3).   
Given these differences, Table 3 summarizes the Gini coefficients and decompositions 
corresponding to sub-periods 1995-2001 and 2003-2010. The results in this Table are useful to 
strengthen the explanations of the increasing share of cash expenditures after 2002 (36% of 
progressivity effect in 2003-2010 vs 25% in 1995-2001), and also of progressivity (RS of -0.084 vs -
0.063), given a quite similar ex ante distribution of income (Gini of 0.497 vs 0.490). 
 
Ex ante vs Ex post 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Kg(transfers) 0,194 0,195 0,239 0,236 0,207 0,218 0,186 0,220 0,328 0,351 0,380 0,400 0,287 0,304 0,339 0,304
g(transfers) 0,089 0,092 0,085 0,090 0,091 0,094 0,091 0,090 0,094 0,094 0,093 0,094 0,096 0,099 0,117 0,122
Transfers 0,017 0,018 0,020 0,021 0,019 0,020 0,017 0,020 0,031 0,033 0,035 0,038 0,028 0,030 0,040 0,037
Kg(in kind) 0,366 0,375 0,396 0,399 0,407 0,419 0,428 0,432 0,411 0,412 0,404 0,405 0,381 0,373 0,400 0,380
g(in kind) 0,195 0,185 0,177 0,178 0,188 0,183 0,180 0,152 0,164 0,170 0,186 0,195 0,206 0,223 0,251 0,265
G in kind 0,071 0,069 0,070 0,071 0,077 0,077 0,077 0,066 0,068 0,070 0,075 0,079 0,079 0,083 0,100 0,101
Kt(x transfers) -0,061 -0,053 -0,058 -0,056 -0,056 -0,049 -0,054 -0,071 -0,051 -0,036 -0,024 -0,030 -0,034 -0,029 -0,056 -0,045
t(x transfers) 0,073 0,064 0,059 0,059 0,058 0,061 0,053 0,057 0,058 0,059 0,059 0,066 0,078 0,080 0,097 0,104
T x transfers -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,004 -0,003 -0,002 -0,001 -0,002 -0,003 -0,002 -0,005 -0,005
Kt(x in kind) -0,124 -0,129 -0,137 -0,137 -0,158 -0,167 -0,149 -0,168 -0,143 -0,111 -0,113 -0,122 -0,099 -0,094 -0,146 -0,129
t(x in kind) 0,182 0,180 0,188 0,185 0,177 0,183 0,151 0,176 0,217 0,243 0,230 0,236 0,232 0,246 0,250 0,283
T x in kind -0,023 -0,023 -0,026 -0,025 -0,028 -0,030 -0,023 -0,030 -0,031 -0,027 -0,026 -0,029 -0,023 -0,023 -0,036 -0,037
RStransfers(+) 0,013 0,015 0,017 0,018 0,015 0,017 0,014 0,016 0,028 0,031 0,034 0,036 0,025 0,028 0,034 0,032
RSinkind (+) 0,049 0,046 0,044 0,046 0,049 0,046 0,054 0,036 0,037 0,043 0,049 0,050 0,056 0,060 0,064 0,064
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Figure 3. Evolution of the consolidate (national and provincial) fiscal balance (% of GDP) and per 
capita GDP (in thousands of constant Pesos of 2010)  
 
 
Table 3: Summary of RS effects: Argentina. Average 1995-2010 and sub-periods 1995-2001 and 
2003-2010. 
Gini and Reynolds-Smolensky coefficients Relationships 
  
Gini ex 
ante 
RS 
(cash) 
Gini 
interim 
RS (in 
kind) 
Gini ex 
post 
Gini ep / 
Gini ea 
RS cash / (RS 
cahs+kind) 
1995-2010 0.496 -0.023 0.473 -0.050 0.423 85% 31% 
1995-2001 0.490 -0.016 0.475 -0.048 0.427 87% 25% 
2003-2010 0.497 -0.030 0.467 -0.054 0.413 83% 36% 
 
Next, we proceed with the analysis along two lines: the contribution of national budget and 
provincial budget to progressivity and the contribution of selected instruments to progressivity.  
Table 4 summarizes the contribution of national and provincial budgets to progressivity (see also 
Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A). The average progressivity of 0.073 (-0.063 in 1995-2001 and -
0.084 in 2003-2010) is the result of progressive expenditure (0.104 in average, 0.092 in 1995-2001 
and 0.116 in 2003-2010) and regressive taxation (approximately -0.03 in average and in the 
corresponding sub-periods). Provincial expenditure accounts for 66% of expenditure progressivity 
(68% in 1995-2001 and 65% in 2003-2010). On the other hand, national revenues explain 
regressive taxation, while provincial taxes contribute very little. Also, provincial expenditures are 
more progressive than national expenditures: the Kakwani coefficient averaged 0.481 in the first 
0.0
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30.0
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40.0
-8%
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case and 0.237 in the second case (because education and health represent a high share of 
provincial expenditure while cash payments represent a lower share of national expenditure). 
Finally, Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show an increasing progressivity of public policy, which 
is due to progressivity in expenditures, both at the national and provincial levels (slightly 
compensated by regressive taxes). The fact that provincial budgets contribute to progressivity was 
already noticed by Cont y Porto (2014) concerning year 2004, which we extend to the whole 
period of analysis.  
Table 4. Reynolds-Smolensky: National and Provincial budgets 
 
Back to Table 2 and Figure 2, notice the increasing role of cash transfers, both in progressivity (the 
Kg coefficient increases from 0.211 in 1995-2001 to 0.337 in 2003-2010) and size (the size 
coefficient increases from 0.09 in 1995-2001 to 0.10 in 2003-2010) in the execution of government 
budgets. Instead, the importance of in-kind expenditures comes from size (the size coefficient 
increases from 0.184 in 1995-2001 to 0.208 in 2003-2010) rather than progressivity (the Kg 
coefficient changes from 0.399 in 1995-2001 to 0.396 in 2003-2010). Both direct and indirect taxes 
become less regressive: the Kt coefficient of direct taxes (Kt x transfers) changes from -0.055 in 
1995-2001 to -0.038 in 2003-2010) and the Kt coefficient of indirect taxes (Kt x in kind) increases 
from -0.143 in 1995-2001 to -0.119 in 2003-2010). But this effect is compensated by an increase in 
the tax levels, from 17.8% of GDP in 1995-2001 to 24.2% of GDP in 2003-2010 for indirect taxes 
(from 6.1% to 7.5%, respectively, for direct taxes). 
A final aggregate comparison concerns the expenditure functions and sources of taxes. Table A.3 
and Figure A.3 in the Appendix show the RS decomposition between expenditures, distinguishing 
social services, economic services, and administration-safety and justice (administration, in short), 
and taxes, distinguishing between production-consumption-transactions, income-assets and 
others. As expected, social expenditure (Kg averaging 0.396, being 0.360 in 1995-2001 and 0.430 
in 2003-2010) is most important than economic services (Kg averaging 0.097, being 0.108 in 1995-
2001 and 0.085 in 2003-2010). However, the size of economic expenditures almost doubled from 
Ex ante vs Ex post 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
g 0,089 0,087 0,090 0,092 0,095 0,097 0,094 0,085 0,098 0,103 0,111 0,116 0,106 0,113 0,140 0,138
gN 0,031 0,030 0,030 0,029 0,028 0,030 0,026 0,028 0,036 0,039 0,040 0,043 0,033 0,036 0,049 0,049
KgN 0,203 0,205 0,229 0,218 0,201 0,217 0,200 0,233 0,272 0,294 0,290 0,306 0,222 0,220 0,255 0,232
gN/(1-t+g) 0,150 0,148 0,132 0,134 0,139 0,136 0,128 0,120 0,134 0,132 0,137 0,141 0,149 0,162 0,192 0,212
gP 0,058 0,057 0,060 0,063 0,067 0,067 0,069 0,057 0,062 0,064 0,071 0,073 0,073 0,078 0,091 0,089
KgP 0,436 0,443 0,463 0,472 0,480 0,482 0,478 0,473 0,497 0,486 0,498 0,496 0,478 0,485 0,518 0,506
gP/(1-t+g) 0,133 0,128 0,130 0,134 0,140 0,140 0,143 0,121 0,125 0,132 0,142 0,148 0,153 0,160 0,175 0,176
t -0,027 -0,027 -0,029 -0,029 -0,031 -0,033 -0,026 -0,034 -0,034 -0,029 -0,027 -0,031 -0,026 -0,025 -0,042 -0,041
tN -0,022 -0,020 -0,022 -0,022 -0,024 -0,025 -0,018 -0,024 -0,024 -0,020 -0,018 -0,021 -0,019 -0,018 -0,032 -0,033
KtN -0,118 -0,113 -0,124 -0,122 -0,141 -0,145 -0,127 -0,142 -0,117 -0,086 -0,084 -0,093 -0,078 -0,072 -0,121 -0,109
tN/(1-t+g) 0,190 0,179 0,177 0,177 0,168 0,175 0,140 0,170 0,204 0,230 0,218 0,229 0,238 0,248 0,264 0,303
tP -0,005 -0,006 -0,007 -0,007 -0,008 -0,008 -0,008 -0,009 -0,010 -0,009 -0,009 -0,009 -0,007 -0,007 -0,010 -0,008
KtP -0,073 -0,099 -0,104 -0,107 -0,112 -0,117 -0,120 -0,148 -0,142 -0,131 -0,129 -0,128 -0,096 -0,096 -0,117 -0,099
tP/(1-t+g) 0,065 0,065 0,069 0,066 0,067 0,068 0,065 0,064 0,071 0,071 0,071 0,074 0,072 0,078 0,083 0,084
RSp -0,062 -0,060 -0,061 -0,064 -0,064 -0,064 -0,069 -0,052 -0,065 -0,074 -0,083 -0,086 -0,081 -0,088 -0,098 -0,097
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2.1% of GDP in 1995-2001 to 4% of GDP in 2003-2010, pushed by government subsidies in energy 
and transport (in these sectors consumption is more evenly distributed across population than in 
other sectors). On the other hand, taxes based on consumption and production increased from 
11.4% of GDP in 1995-2001 to 16.7% of GDP in 2003-2010, mostly explained by increases in VAT 
and the introduction of export taxes; while taxes based on income and assets increased from 9% 
of GDP in 1995-2001 to 11.8% of GDP in 2003-2010. Again, sizes compensated the lower 
component of regressive taxation. 
V. Conclusions  
This paper analyzes the effect of consolidate (national-provincial) fiscal policy on personal income 
distribution during 1995-2010 with three Gini coefficients.  The first index –Gini ex ante– measures 
(a simulated) income inequality arising from market forces, without government intervention. The 
second –Gini interim– measures income inequality after adding government cash expenditures 
(transfers and payments to households) to, and subtracting the corresponding taxes (referred to 
as “direct taxes”) from, ex ante income. The third –Gini ex post– adds to actual income a residuum 
coming from provision of in-kind public and quasi-public goods (education, health, etc.) and 
subtracts indirect taxes, which results in a measure of extended income. 
The Gini ex ante increased from 0.470 in 1995 to 0.523 in 2002 (0.05 worse than 1995) and to 
0.483 in 2010 (0.01 worse than 1995). The Gini interim increased from 0.457 to 0.508 in 2002 (0.05 
worse than 1995) and decreased to 0.451 in 2010 (0.01 better than 1995). The Gini ex post 
increased from 0.409 in 1995 to 0.471 in 2002 (0.06 worse than 1995) and decreased to 0.386 in 
2010 (0.02 better). The effect of fiscal policy is a reduction in the Gini of 6 points in 1995, 5 points 
in 2002 and 10 points in 2010. 
The mix of instruments to redistribute income changed with time. The intensity in the use of 
instruments tilted towards cash transfers and against in-kind expenditures. The “mix effect” has 
two consequences. On the one hand, it creates dependence by cash-recipients, not only a financial 
dependence but also a political dependence, favoring clientelism. On the other hand, it is far from 
the most efficient tool to correct income distribution. 
The trends in income inequality have a parallel with the different macroeconomic regimes nested 
in the sample (convertibility between 1995 and 2001 and post convertibility since 2002). From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the period between 1991 and 2001, known as the 90s decade, was 
characterized by an economy with an exchange rate pegged to the U.S. dollar subject to the 
Convertibility Law, strict monetary rules, but lax fiscal rules that ended in deficits during the 
second half of the decade and a social and economic crisis by the end of 2001. After the critical 
year of 2002, the next eight years were characterized by an expanding economy exposed to very 
favorable external conditions, a fixed exchange rate albeit free from the constraints imposed by 
the Convertibility Law, and more flexible monetary and fiscal environments. 
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The average progressivity of -0.073 (-0.063 in 1995-2001 and -0.084 in 2003-2010) is the result of 
progressive expenditure (0.104 in average, 0.092 in 1995-2001 and 0.116 in 2003-2010) and 
regressive taxation (approximately -0.03 in average and in the corresponding sub-periods). 
Provincial expenditure accounts for 66% of expenditure progressivity (68% in 1995-2001 and 65% 
in 2003-2010). National revenues explain regressive taxation, while provincial taxes contribute 
very little.  
Finally, as expected, social expenditure is the most important redistribution tool. However, we 
notice the increasing role of economic services (which are less progressive than social services) in 
the post-convertibility sub period, pushed by government subsidies in energy and transport. 
We alert of the importance of understanding the limitations of works that measure (partial or full) 
incidence of fiscal policy, which go beyond assumptions made to allocate expenditures and taxes 
among households. Typically, papers measure the distribution of budget but leave aside the 
distribution of results. For example, some papers have found pro-poor expenditures alongside 
pro-rich results (see Skinner and Zhou, 2006, and comment by Le Grand, 2006). Among other 
reasons, Dixon et al. (2007) find significant results from the substitution of low-quality public 
goods or services for high-quality private goods, differences in information of different groups and 
their control on the way services are provided (not only through “exit” as in the previous case, but 
also through “voice”), or the cost of complementary services (transport costs or indirect cost of 
forgone labor to receive health services, etc.). 
Another example, concerning education in Argentina, is that expenditure in elementary and high-
school education is pro-poor; however, performance results by public schools is significantly lower 
that performance by private schools. This is reflected, for example, in trend changes in school 
enrolment (83 out of 100 new students in elementary and high-school enrolled in private schools 
during 2003-2010; this ratio was 22 in 1996-2003), success rates (70 percent of enrolled students 
in private schools finish high-school; this rate is 27 in public schools), and geographic performance 
(40 percent of enrolled in CABA graduated from high school; 14 in Santiago del Estero); see CEA 
(2015). 
Provincial budgets contribute strongly to progressivity. A direct conclusion from this result is the 
need to strengthen relationships between national government and provincial and municipal 
governments, and to improve efficiency in provision of services (complementing the potential 
negative results on performance).  
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Appendix A. Complementary Tables and Figures 
Table A.1. Argentina. Regional indicators, 2010 
Jurisdiction Surface 
(sq km) 
Population 
('000) 
Population 
density 
GGP 
(million 
dollars) 
Per capita 
GGP (‘000 
dollars) 
Human 
Development 
Index (2011) 
Unsatisfied 
basic 
needs 
A Buenos Aires 307,571 15,316 49.8 130,332 8,510 0.84 8% 
A City Bs As (CABA) 200 3,058 15,291.5 84,128 27,508 0.89 6% 
A Córdoba 165,321 3,397 20.5 26,671 7,852 0.86 6% 
A Mendoza 148,827 1,766 11.9 12,282 6,956 0.85 8% 
A Santa Fe 133,007 3,285 24.7 32,966 10,035 0.85 6% 
A Advanced (5 prov.) 754,926 26,822 35.5 286,379 10,677 0.85 7% 
I Entre Ríos 78,781 1,282 16.3 7,861 6,132 0.84 8% 
I Salta 155,488 1,267 8.2 5,006 3,950 0.83 19% 
I San Juan 89,651 715 8.0 3,293 4,605 0.83 10% 
I San Luis 76,748 457 6.0 3,020 6,611 0.83 8% 
I Tucumán 22,524 1,512 67.1 6,615 4,377 0.84 13% 
I Intermediate (5 prov.) 423,192 5,233 12.4 25,794 4,929 0.84 12% 
LD Chubut 224,686 471 2.1 5,854 12,436 0.85 8% 
LD La Pampa 143,440 341 2.4 1,823 5,338 0.86 4% 
LD Neuquén 94,078 565 6.0 7,780 13,764 0.86 10% 
LD Río Negro 203,013 604 3.0 4,790 7,933 0.85 9% 
LD Santa Cruz 243,943 234 1.0 3,767 16,092 0.87 8% 
LD Tierra del Fuego 21,571 134 6.2 2,551 19,081 0.88 14% 
LD Low Density (6 prov.) 930,731 2,349 2.5 26,565 11,309 0.86 9% 
L Catamarca 102,602 404 3.9 3,253 8,047 0.84 11% 
L Chaco 99,633 1,071 10.8 4,117 3,844 0.81 18% 
L Corrientes 88,199 1,036 11.7 4,259 4,112 0.83 15% 
L Formosa 72,066 556 7.7 1,919 3,453 0.81 20% 
L Jujuy 53,219 698 13.1 3,089 4,422 0.83 15% 
L La Rioja 89,680 355 4.0 1,526 4,294 0.83 12% 
L Misiones 29,801 1,111 37.3 7,402 6,660 0.82 16% 
L Santiago del Estero 136,351 884 6.5 3,340 3,781 0.81 18% 
L Lagged (8 prov.) 671,551 6,116 9.1 28,905 4,726 0.82 16% 
  Argentina 2,780,400 40,519 14.6 367,643 9,073 0.85 9% 
  (std. deviation)         0.64 0.03 0.51 
Source: own elaboration based on INDEC Argentina (surface, population, and Unsatisfied Basic Needs), and United 
Nations (Human Development Index). Note: A: Advanced; I: Intermediate; LD: Low Density; L: Lagged. 
 
 
  
 17 
 
Table A.2. National, provincial and consolidate budgets. Period 1995-2010. Values as % of GDP. 
Source: own elaboration based of public information on fiscal budgets. 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
National Expenditure 17% 17% 15% 16% 18% 18% 18% 14% 15% 14% 16% 16% 17% 18% 22% 23%
Discretionary Transfers 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 3%
Ca sh expenditure 7% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 10%
In-kind expendi ture 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 9% 11% 12%
Soci al  s ervices 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 13% 14%
Economic s ervices 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5%
Admini stra ti on, jus tice, defence 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Debt interests 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
National Resources 16% 15% 14% 15% 15% 16% 14% 15% 17% 17% 18% 18% 19% 20% 23% 25%
Di rect taxes 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 6% 6% 7% 8%
Indi rect taxes 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 12% 10% 11% 13% 14% 14% 14% 13% 15% 15% 17%
Production, cons umption, tra ns fers 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 9% 10% 9% 9% 10% 11% 10% 11%
Income, a s sets 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 9% 10%
Other 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 3% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4%
National Balance -2% -3% -2% -2% -3% -2% -5% 0% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% -1% -1%
Provincial Expenditure 14% 14% 14% 14% 15% 15% 16% 13% 13% 13% 14% 15% 15% 16% 18% 18%
Ca sh expenditure 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 3%
In-kind expendi ture 12% 11% 11% 12% 12% 12% 13% 10% 10% 11% 12% 12% 13% 13% 15% 15%
Soci al  s ervices 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 9% 9% 10% 12% 11%
Economic s ervices 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Admini stra ti on, jus tice, defence 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 5%
Debt interests 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Resources - Provincial Budget 13% 13% 14% 13% 14% 14% 14% 12% 13% 14% 15% 15% 15% 16% 17% 18%
Provincial Resources 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 9% 9%
Di rect taxes 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Indi rect taxes 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 6%
Production, cons umption, tra ns fers 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Income, a s sets 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Other 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Revenue-sharing regime 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 7%
Di rect taxes 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Indi rect taxes 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Production, cons umption, tra ns fers 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5%
Income, a s sets 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Discretionary transfers 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 3%
Provincial Balance -1% 0% 0% -1% -1% -1% -2% -1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1% 0%
Consolidate Expenditure 31% 31% 29% 30% 33% 33% 35% 27% 28% 27% 30% 31% 32% 34% 40% 41%
Ca sh expenditure 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 12% 12%
In-kind expendi ture 20% 19% 18% 18% 20% 19% 19% 15% 16% 16% 18% 19% 20% 22% 26% 27%
Soci al  s ervices 19% 19% 18% 18% 20% 20% 20% 17% 17% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% 25% 25%
Economic s ervices 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6%
Admini stra ti on, jus tice, defence 7% 7% 7% 7% 8% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 6% 8% 8%
Debt interests 2% 2% 2% 3% 4% 4% 5% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Consolidate Resources 28% 27% 27% 28% 28% 30% 27% 26% 29% 31% 31% 32% 33% 35% 38% 41%
Di rect taxes 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 6% 7% 8% 9% 11% 11%
Indi rect taxes 20% 20% 21% 21% 21% 22% 20% 20% 23% 25% 25% 25% 25% 26% 27% 30%
Production, cons umption, tra ns fers 13% 13% 13% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 15% 17% 17% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20%
Income, a s sets 11% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 11% 9% 10% 11% 12% 12% 13% 13% 15% 16%
Other 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 5%
Consolidate Balance -3% -3% -2% -3% -5% -3% -7% -1% 2% 4% 1% 1% 1% 0% -2% 0%
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Figure A.1. Reynolds Smolensky (total expenditure, total taxes). RS is defined “positive” 
 
Observation: Expenditure (Taxes) measures the joint effect of size and progressivity g*Kg (t*Kt).   
 
Figure A.2. Progressivity of national and provincial expenditure, national and provincial taxes. 
 
Observation: Expenditure (Taxes) measures the joint effect of size and progressivity g*Kg (t*Kt).   
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Table A.3. Progressivity of expenditures (social services, economic services and administration) 
and taxes (production-consumption-transactions, income-assets, others) 
 
 
Figure A.3. Progressivity of expenditures (social services, economic services and administration) 
and taxes (production-consumption-transactions, income-assets, others)  
 
Observation: Expenditure (Taxes) measures the joint effect of size and progressivity g*Kg (t*Kt).   
 
 
Ex ante vs Ex post 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Kg_(SS) 0,338 0,337 0,375 0,371 0,364 0,371 0,364 0,368 0,423 0,429 0,452 0,463 0,403 0,412 0,442 0,419
g_(SS) 0,186 0,184 0,175 0,179 0,187 0,190 0,188 0,171 0,174 0,175 0,181 0,189 0,197 0,207 0,240 0,246
Kg_(ES) 0,095 0,110 0,092 0,107 0,123 0,122 0,105 0,123 0,080 0,115 0,095 0,088 0,067 0,070 0,085 0,079
g_(ES) 0,025 0,024 0,022 0,022 0,020 0,018 0,017 0,013 0,024 0,025 0,034 0,036 0,042 0,051 0,050 0,060
Kg_(A) 0,321 0,330 0,351 0,354 0,345 0,354 0,357 0,359 0,377 0,392 0,397 0,402 0,378 0,379 0,383 0,369
g_(A) 0,073 0,068 0,065 0,066 0,072 0,068 0,067 0,057 0,061 0,064 0,065 0,064 0,063 0,065 0,077 0,082
Kt_(PCT) -0,102 -0,111 -0,117 -0,122 -0,129 -0,127 -0,131 -0,120 -0,109 -0,102 -0,103 -0,109 -0,086 -0,075 -0,110 -0,094
t_(PCT) 0,117 0,122 0,122 0,120 0,110 0,110 0,099 0,119 0,145 0,168 0,157 0,162 0,165 0,177 0,170 0,193
Kt_(IA) -0,035 -0,027 -0,030 -0,027 -0,033 -0,028 -0,034 -0,054 -0,034 -0,025 -0,018 -0,023 -0,022 -0,019 -0,044 -0,035
t_(IA) 0,100 0,091 0,088 0,092 0,088 0,092 0,080 0,080 0,095 0,109 0,107 0,113 0,121 0,121 0,134 0,148
Kt_(R) -0,308 -0,346 -0,336 -0,366 -0,386 -0,405 -0,385 -0,438 -0,433 -0,375 -0,366 -0,376 -0,353 -0,358 -0,405 -0,392
t_(R) 0,038 0,031 0,036 0,031 0,037 0,042 0,026 0,034 0,034 0,025 0,025 0,028 0,024 0,028 0,043 0,046
RSp -0,062 -0,060 -0,061 -0,064 -0,064 -0,064 -0,069 -0,052 -0,065 -0,074 -0,083 -0,086 -0,081 -0,088 -0,098 -0,097
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Expenditure (Social Services) Expenditure (Economic Services)
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